Secure Capacity Region for Erasure Broadcast Channels with Feedback by Czap, László et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
11
0.
57
41
v1
  [
cs
.IT
]  
26
 O
ct 
20
11
Secure Capacity Region for Erasure Broadcast Channels with Feedback
László Czap Vinod M. Prabhakaran Suhas Diggavi Christina Fragouli
EPFL, TIFR, UCLA and EPFL
Abstract. We formulate and study a cryptographic problem relevant to wireless: a sender, Alice, wants to transmit
private messages to two receivers, Bob and Calvin, using unreliable wireless broadcast transmissions and short pub-
lic feedback from Bob and Calvin. We ask, at what rates can we broadcast the private messages if we also provide
(information-theoretic) unconditional security guarantees that Bob and Calvin do not learn each-other’s message? We
characterize the largest transmission rates to the two receivers, for any protocol that provides unconditional security
guarantees. We design a protocol that operates at any rate-pair within the above region, uses very simple interactions
and operations, and is robust to misbehaving users.
1 Introduction
Wireless bandwidth is scarce – to efficiently use it, we need to mix private messages intended for different users
– and this makes securing such channels hard. Consider the situation where a wireless access point, Alice,
wants to send private messages to two receivers, Bob and Calvin. To do so, Alice can only use the wireless
channel, where each packet transmission is broadcast and subject to errors. A simple strategy is for Alice to
keep retransmitting each packet until it is acknowledged by the intended receiver. But as Alice repeatedly
broadcasts a packet intended for Bob, Calvin may overhear it. In fact, recent work has established that Calvin
should try to overhear the packets intended for Bob, while Alice should code across the private packets she
has for Calvin and Bob, as this can significantly increase the communication rates both receivers experience
[1,2,3,4,5]. Fig. 1 illustrates such an example. In the wireless community, the need for bandwidth efficiency
is acutely perceived, and there is significant effort in developing and deploying such schemes that rely on
opportunistic overhearing and mixing of private messages [6,7,8]. However, the gain in efficiency seems to
come with a security compromise, since Bob and Calvin learn parts of each other’s message. This leads us to
ask a new question.
Question: In a wireless broadcasting setting1, can we characterize the optimal unconditional (information-
theoretic) secure transmission rates for conveying private messages to Bob and Calvin?
In this paper we answer this question when Alice can use a broadcast erasure channel, while Bob and
Calvin can send (public, reliable, and authenticated) packet acknowledgments. That is, each transmission of
Alice is either perfectly received or completely lost by Bob and Calvin independently from each other, and
they can causally acknowledge this fact. Channels that perfectly erase packets do not exist in nature; even if
a packet is corrupted by noise it would still be possible to extract some information from it. However, recent
experimental results on wireless testbeds show that one can create almost perfect erasures through careful
insertion of interference and appropriate coding [9,10]. This mechanism also enables erasure channels with
known erasure probabilities. Furthermore, the results for erasure channels can serve as building blocks for
noisy wireless channels [11,12,13].
If we do not insist on information theoretic security guarantees, there exist today methods to answer this
question; our work as far as we know is the first to examine whether it is possible to provide unconditional
guarantees and at what rates.
Our contributions: We propose a low-complexity two-phase protocol, which first efficiently generates secure
keys and then judiciously uses them for encryption exploiting the wireless broadcast properties. We prove our
protocol is optimal by showing a matching impossibility result: we show that no other scheme can achieve
1 To formalize this question we need to specify (i) what is a good model for the noisy broadcast channel? (ii) what kind of feedback
is feasible? (iii) what is the notion of security that we seek? (iv) what is the power of the adversary? (v) what is the measure of
transmission efficiency? We formally discuss these aspects in Section 2.
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Fig. 1. An example where mixing private messages increases the transmission efficiency. Alice wants to send
packet B to Bob and C to Calvin; symbol X indicates that a transmitted packet is not successfully received
due to corruption by the channel. Alice first broadcasts message B; Calvin successfully receives it, while Bob
fails to do so. Next, Alice transmits message C; Bob successfully receives it, while Calvin fails. Alice can take
advantage of this side information Bob and Calvin have, and transmit the message B+C. This transmission is
maximally useful for both receivers: assume both receive it, Bob, since he knows C, he can retrieve B, and
Calvin, since he knows B, he can retrieve C. Thus the protocol concludes in three transmissions. In contrast,
if we did not use coding across the private messages, we would need at least four transmissions, yielding 33%
reduction in efficiency.
better secure private transmission rates to Bob and Calvin. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result
on information-theoretic security where the optimal strategy has a natural need for a two-phase protocol for
secure message transmission. Our impossibility result also introduces new information-theoretic techniques
that utilize a balance between generated and consumed keys, although the bounds are true for any valid security
protocol which does not constrain it to be a two-phase scheme.
Our protocol is based on the following ideas. First, Alice-Bob and Alice-Calvin may create unconditionally
secure pairwise secret keys KB and KC respectively, using a fundamental observation of Maurer [14]: different
receivers have different looks on the transmitted signals, and we can build on these differences with the help
of feedback to create secret keys [9,10]. For example, if Alice transmits random packets through independent
erasure channels with erasure probability 0.5, there would be a good fraction of them (approximately 25%)
that only Bob receives, and we can transform this common randomness between Alice and Bob to a key KB
using privacy amplification2 [14,9,10,15]. A novel aspect of our protocol is that the secure keys for both Bob
and Calvin are generated simultaneously using the same sequence of transmissions by Alice, thus optimally
utilizing wireless broadcasting.
A naive approach is to generate the secret keys KB, KC with the same size as the respective private mes-
sages and use them as one-time pads. This is too pessimistic in our case: Calvin is only going to receive a
fraction of the packets intended for Bob and thus we only need to create an amount of key that allows us to
protect against this fraction. To build on this observation, feedback is useful; knowing which packets Bob has
successfully received (or not), allows us to decide what to transmit next, so that we preserve as much secrecy
from Calvin as possible; and symmetrically for Calvin. In the second phase of our protocol, we combine these
ideas with a network coding strategy [16,17,1] that makes transmissions maximally useful to both Bob and
Calvin. Fig. 2 shows the benefits of our approach (which achieves the secret message capacity) compared to the
naive scheme.
Our protocol does not rely on both users operating honestly: even if we assume that Calvin misbehaves, for
example by sending fake acknowledgments (see Section 4), we can still provide the same security guarantees
and operational rate to the correctly behaving Bob.
Related work: Secure transmission of messages using noisy channel properties was pioneered by Wyner [18],
who characterized the secret message capacity of wiretap channels. This led to a long sequence of research
on information-theoretic security on various generalizations of the wiretap channel [19,20]. Notably, when the
eavesdropper and legitimate channel are statistically identical, then the wiretap framework yields no security.
2 In fact this can be done using linear combinations of the received packets, thereby allowing for a complexity that is polynomial in
the number of transmitted packets [9,15].
The fact that feedback can give security even in this case was first observed for secret key agreement by Maurer
[14] and further developed by Ahlswede-Csiszár [21] – but secure key agreement is not the same as secure
transmission of specific messages. The wiretap channel with secure feedback and its variants for message
security have been studied in [22,23]; some conclusive results are developed in special cases when there is a
secure feedback inaccessible to the eavesdropper. Security of private message broadcasting without feedback
has been studied in [24], where some conclusive results have been established. As mentioned earlier, the use
of feedback and broadcast for private message transmission, without security requirements has been studied
in [2,3]. We believe that ours are the first conclusive results that use insecure (and very limited) feedback for
information-theoretic security of multiple private messages. We use linear code constructions that superficially
seem similar to those in secret sharing [25], but our problem is different since we obtain secrecy for all erasure
probabilities, by leveraging feedback3 . Another problem that is different but bears some similarities, is that of
broadcast encryption [26,27], where a group of users receive a common secret message, and the issue is to deal
with key management when users unsubscribe.
Outline: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the communication and security
model, Section 3 gives our main result and a simple example, Section 4 formally describes our protocol, Section
5 contains the security analysis, Section 6 establishes optimality by proving an impossibility theorem and
Section 7 concludes by discussing several possible extensions. Detailed proofs are provided in the Appendices.
2 Problem formulation and system model
We consider a three party communication setting with one sender (Alice) and two receivers (Bob and Calvin).
The goal of Alice is to securely send private messages W1 and W2 to Bob and Calvin, such that the receivers
may not learn each other’s messages.
Alice employs a memoryless erasure broadcast channel defined as follows. The inputs of the channel are
length L vectors over Fq, which we call sometimes packets. The ith input is denoted by Xi. The ith output of
the channel seen by Bob is Y1,i, while the output seen by Calvin is Y2,i. The broadcast channel consists of two
independent erasure channels towards Bob and Calvin. We denote δ1 the erasure probability of Bob’s channel
and δ2 that of Calvin’s channel. More precisely,
Pr{Y1,i, Y2,i|Xi} = Pr{Y1,i|Xi}Pr{Y2,i|Xi},
Pr{Y1,i|Xi} =
{
1− δ1, Y1,i = Xi
δ1, Yi =⊥,
and Pr{Y2,i|Xi} =
{
1− δ2, Y2,i = Xi
δ2, Y2,i =⊥,
where ⊥ is the symbol of an erasure.
Assumptions: We assume that the receivers send public acknowledgments after each transmission stating
whether or not they received the transmission correctly. By public we mean that the acknowledgments are
available not only for Alice but for the other receiver as well.4 We assume that some authentication method
prevents the receivers from forging each other’s acknowledgments. Also, we assume that both Bob and Calvin
only know each other’s acknowledgment causally, after they have revealed their own (we justify this in Section 7
when we discuss Denial-of-Service attacks).
Let Si denote the state of the channel in the ith transmission, Si ∈ {B,C,BC, ∅} corresponding to the
receptions “Bob only”, “Calvin only”, “Both” and “None”, respectively. Further, S∗i denotes the state based on
the acknowledgments sent by Bob and Calvin. If both users report honestly, then Si = S∗i . We denote as Si the
vector that collects all the states up to the ith, i.e., Si = [S1 . . . Si], and similarly for Si∗.
Beside the communication capability as described above, all users can securely generate private random-
ness. We denote byΘA, ΘB and ΘC the private random strings Alice, Bob, and Calvin, respectively have access
to. All parties have perfect knowledge of the communication model.
3 Secret sharing would require that the number of erasures of the adversary is smaller than that of the legitimate receiver.
4 In a practical setting, we do not need to actually have a public error-free channel to send the acknowledgments: since these are very
short packets, we can utilize a sufficiently strong error correcting code and send them through the noisy wireless channels.
2.1 Security and reliability requirements
An (n, ǫ,N1, N2) scheme sends N1 packets to Bob and N2 to Calvin using n transmissions from Alice with
error probability smaller than ǫ. Formally:
Definition 1. An (n, ǫ,N1, N2) scheme for the two user message transmission problem consists of the following
components: (a) message alphabets W1 = FLN1q and W2 = FLN2q , (b) encoding maps fi(.), i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
and (c) decoding maps φ1(.) and φ2(.), such that if the inputs to the channel are
Xi = fi(W1,W2, ΘA, S
∗i−1), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (1)
where W1 ∈ W1 and W2 ∈ W2 are arbitrary messages in their respective alphabets and ΘA is the private ran-
domness Alice has access to, then, provided the receivers acknowledge honestly, their estimates after decoding
Wˆ1 = φ1(Y
n
1 ) and Wˆ2 = φ2(Y n2 ) satisfy
Pr{Wˆ1 6=W1} < ǫ, and (2)
Pr{Wˆ2 6=W2} < ǫ. (3)
Definition 2. An (n, ǫ,N1, N2) scheme is said to be secure against honest-but-curious users if in case both re-
ceivers are honest and the input messages W1 and W2 are independent random variables distributed uniformly
over their respective alphabets, in addition to conditions (2)-(3) the following two conditions also hold:
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘC) < ǫ (4)
I(W2;Y
n
1 S
nΘB) < ǫ. (5)
Malicious user: We will say that a user is malicious if the user can (a) select the marginal distribution of the
other user’s message arbitrarily; his own message is assumed to be independent of the other user’s message
and uniformly distributed over his alphabet and the malicious user does not have access to his own message,
and (b) produce dishonest acknowledgments as a (potentially randomized) function of all the information he
has access to when producing each acknowledgment (this includes all the packets and the pattern of erasures
he received up to and including the current packet he is acknowledging and the acknowledgments sent by the
other user over the public channel up to the previous packet). We allow at most one user to be malicious.
Definition 3. An (n, ǫ,N1, N2) scheme is said to be secure against a malicious user, if in case one of the
receivers is malicious (as defined above), the scheme guarantees for the other (honest) receiver decodability
and security as in definitions 1 and 2. That is, if Calvin is the malicious user, (2) and (4) are satisfied for Bob,
while if Bob is the malicious user, (3) and (5) are satisfied for Calvin.
Clearly a scheme which is secure against a malicious user is also secure against honest-but-curious users since
the malicious user may choose the uniform distribution for the other user’s message and choose to acknowledge
truthfully.
Secret message capacity region: The communication rate Ri towards receiver i expresses the number of
message Wi bits successfully and securely delivered to receiver i per channel use5. We are interested in char-
acterizing all rate pairs (R1, R2) that our channel can support.
Definition 4. The rate pair (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ is said to be achievable, if for every ǫ, ǫ′ > 0 there are N1 and N2
and a large enough n such that there exists an (n, ǫ,N1, N2) scheme that is secure against a malicious user
and6
R1 − ǫ
′ <
1
n
N1L log q, R2 − ǫ
′ <
1
n
N2L log q. (6)
The secret message capacity region R ⊂ R2+ is defined as the set of all achievable rate pairs.
5 Channel use refers to Alice using the channel once to send one packet.
6 All logarithms in this paper are to the base 2 unless otherwise specified.
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Fig. 2. Achieved rate region (in bits/packet) by the naive scheme in contrast to the optimal scheme and to the
capacity region for the message sending problem with no security requirements. For this example δ1 = 0.7,
δ2 = 0.6, L = 1, q = 2. Translating this region to bits/sec depends on how fast the source can send packets:
for example, if we operate at the point (R1 = 0.1, R2 = 0.2) and the transmission rate of 1Mbits/sec that
IEEE802.11b supports, we would securely send ≈ 100Kbits/sec to Bob and ≈ 200Kbits/sec to Calvin.
3 Main result
Theorem 1. The secret message capacity region as defined in Definition 4 is the set of all rate pairs (R1, R2) ∈
R
2
+ which satisfy the following two inequalities:
R1(1− δ2)
δ2(1− δ1)(1− δ1δ2)
+
R1
1− δ1
+
R2
1− δ1δ2
≤ L log q, (7)
R2(1− δ1)
δ1(1− δ2)(1− δ1δ2)
+
R1
1− δ1δ2
+
R2
1− δ2
≤ L log q. (8)
The first term of these inequalities can be interpreted as the overhead for security, because – as we will see
soon – it corresponds to the duration of a secret key generation phase. Omitting these terms gives us the ca-
pacity region for the message transmission problem with two users without any secrecy requirements [2]. The
difference between these two capacity regions (with and without secrecy requirements) is illustrated in Fig. 2
for some specific values of the parameters δ1, δ2, L and q.
We prove Theorem 1 in two steps. First, we provide a protocol in Section 4 and prove in Section 5 that
this protocol achieves all the rate pairs in the capacity region. The complexity of the scheme is discussed in
Appendix A. Then we provide in Section 6 a proof to show that (7) and (8) are also bounds that are impossible
to exceed by any protocol (a converse in information-theory parlance). Interestingly, our converse holds even
for the capacity region defined using the weaker honest-but-curious security definition, i.e., a malicious user
cannot deteriorate the performance experienced by an honest user. The following simple example illustrates the
main ideas in our protocol.
3.1 A simplified example when both receivers are honest-but-curious
Alice wants to securely send the N1 = 3 message packets W1 = [W1,1,W1,2,W1,3] to Bob and the N2 = 3
message packets W2 = [W2,1,W2,2,W3,2] to Calvin. Both Bob and Calvin are honest and report back truthfully.
The protocol proceeds as depicted in Table 1.
Table 1. An example of a simplified protocol when both receivers are honest but curious.
Alice sends Bob’s Calvin’s Bob’s key Calvin’s key Bob decoded Calvin decodedACK ACK
Key generation


X1 random X × KB,1 = X1
X2 random X X KB,1
X3 random × X KB,1 KC,1 = X3
X4 random × X KB,1 KC,1,KC,2 = X4
X5 random X × KB,1,KB,2 = X5 KC,1,KC,2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Message trans-
mission for
Bob
{
X6 = W1,1 ⊕KB,1 × X KB,2 KC,1,KC,2
X7 = W1,2 ⊕KB,2 X × KB,2 KC,1,KC,2 W1,2
X8 = W1,3 ⊕KB,2 X X KC,1,KC,2 W1,2,W1,3
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Message trans-
mission for
Calvin


X9 = W2,1 ⊕KC,1 × X KC,1,KC,2 W1,2,W1,3 W2,1
X10 = W2,2 ⊕KC,1 × × KC,1,KC,2 W1,2,W1,3 W2,1
X11 = X10 X × KC,2 W1,2,W1,3 W2,1
X12 = W2,3 ⊕KC,2 X × W1,2,W1,3 W2,1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Message send-
ing for both
{
X13 = X6 ⊕X11 X X W1,2,W1,3,W1,1 W2,1,W2,2
X14 = X12 X X W1,2,W1,3,W1,1 W2,1,W2,2,W2,3
Key generation: Alice transmits five random packets X1, . . . ,X5. At the end of this phase, Alice and Bob share
the two secret key packets KB,1 = X1 and KB,2 = X5 that Bob received and Calvin did not. Similarly, Alice
and Calvin share the secret key packets KC,1 = X3 and KC,2 = X4. The packet X2 which was received by
both Bob and Calvin is discarded.
Message transmission for Bob: We secure Bob’s messages with one-time pads and transmit them until either
Bob or Calvin receive them; we start by sending X6 =W1,1 ⊕KB,1, where ⊕ denotes addition in FLq .
− Since only Calvin receives X6, we consider the keyKB,1 as consumed (Calvin observed a linear combination
of it), and the message W1,1 as undelivered (Bob did not receive anything). We will deal with undelivered
messages at the last stage; at this point we proceed to send the new packet X7 =W1,2 ⊕KB,2.
− Since only Bob receives X7, we consider the message W1,2 as delivered (Bob can retrieve it from X7) and
the key KB,2 as unconsumed (it remains secret from Calvin); we can reuse it to send X8 =W1,3 ⊕KB,2.
− Since both Calvin and Bob receive X8, the message W1,3 is delivered to Bob and the key KB,2 is consumed.
At the end of this phase Bob has received packets W1,2 and W1,3 and is missing packet W1,1.
Message transmission for Calvin: We similarly make a first attempt to deliver Calvin’s message. We assume
we are less successful than before, and although we consume both keys KC,1 and KC,2, we only deliver to
Calvin W2,1. Note that X10 which is not received by any user is simply retransmitted.
Message transmission for both: To deliver the remaining messages W1,1, W2,2 and W2,3, we take advantage of
the fact that Bob already has X11 and Calvin has X6: we send X13 = X6 ⊕X11 that is maximally useful for
both. Bob can recover X6 and from this W1,1, while Calvin can recover X11 and from this W2,2. Note that X13
brings no information to Bob or Calvin for each other’s message.
Important properties: This simple scheme has the following properties.
− The number of key packets we set up and consume is smaller than the number of message packets we convey
per user, because we can reuse certain keys that the adversary did not receive.
− At the last message transmission phase, we exploit side information users have for each other’s message to
make a single transmission useful to both, without consuming any new key.
Towards the general protocol: If a node is dishonest he can send fake acknowledgments. Interestingly, we
can rely on the expected behavior of the channel (and coding techniques) to have no performance loss for the
honest user. For example, in the key generation phase, if we expect that Calvin will only receive one of the three
packets Bob successfully receives, we can produce for Bob the keysKB,1 = X1⊕X2 andKB,2 = X2⊕X5 that
are secure from Calvin no matter which packet he received. Similarly, when we send packets to Bob, assume
we expect Calvin to receive two of these transmissions – but we do not know which two. We then create three
linear combinations of Bob’s keys, say K ′1,1 = KB,1, K ′1,2 = KB,2, K ′1,3 = KB,1 ⊕ KB,2, and transmit
X6 =W1,1⊕K
′
1,1, X7 =W1,2⊕K
′
1,2, and X8 =W1,3⊕K ′1,3 - no matter which two of these Calvin receives
we are secure. Our protocol builds on these ideas.
4 Protocol
We now describe a (n, ǫ,N1, N2) scheme that is secure against a malicious user as in Definition 3.
Parameters: The operation of the protocol utilizes a set of parameters which we can directly calculate before
the protocol starts, and whose use we will describe in the following.
kB = N1
1− δ2
1− δ1δ2
+
(
N1
1− δ2
1− δ1δ2
)3/4
, kC = N2
1− δ1
1− δ1δ2
+
(
N2
1− δ1
1− δ1δ2
)3/4
. (9)
k1 =
kB
δ2
+
1
δ2
(
2kB
δ2
)3/4
, k2 =
kC
δ1
+
1
δ1
(
2kC
δ1
)3/4
. (10)
n1 = max
(
k1
1− δ1
+
(
k1
1− δ1
)3/4
,
k2
1− δ2
+
(
k2
1− δ2
)3/4)
. (11)
n2 =
N1
1− δ1δ2
+
(
N1
1− δ1δ2
)3/4
, n3 =
N2
1− δ1δ2
+
(
N2
1− δ1δ2
)3/4
. (12)
n4 = max
(
N1
1− δ1
+
(
N1
1− δ1
)3/4
− n2,
N2
1− δ2
+
(
N2
1− δ2
)3/4
− n3
)
. (13)
n = n1 + n2 + n3 + n4. (14)
Main idea: Using our protocol, Alice attempts to send N1 message packets W1 = (W1,1,W1,2, . . . ,W1,N1) to
Bob and W2 = (W2,1,W2,2, . . . ,W2,N2) to Calvin using at most n packet transmissions. She either succeeds
in sending W1 to Bob or declares an error for Bob. Similarly, she either succeeds in sending W2 to Calvin
or declares an error for Calvin. We will argue in Section 5 that the failure probability can be made arbitrarily
small. She proceeds in the following steps.
I. Key generation. Generation of kB shared secret key packets between Alice-Bob and kC secret packets
between Alice-Calvin using n1 transmissions. This step fails if we do not succeed to generate the required
number of secret key packets.
II. Message encryption and transmission. She encrypts the messages using the produced keys and reliably
transmits them to the two receivers. This step fails if we do not manage to deliver all the N1 and N2
message packets within the prescribed number of transmissions.
Protocol Description
Key Generation
1. Alice transmits n1 packets X1, . . . ,Xn1 . She generates these packets uniformly at random from FLq using
her private randomness, and independently of W1, W2.
2. Bob and Calvin acknowledge which packets they have received. If Bob receives less than k1 packets we
declare a protocol error for him. Similarly for Calvin if he receives less than k2 packets. When an error is
declared for both users, the protocol terminates. If not, we continue with the user not in error, as if the user
in error did not exist.
3. Let XB1 be a L× k1 matrix that has as columns the first k1 packets that Bob acknowledged. Alice and Bob
create kB secret key packets as KB = XB1 GKB , where GKB is a (k1 × kB) matrix and is a parity check
matrix of an (k1, k1 − kB) Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) code [28]. KB is a shared key set up
between Alice and Bob, and consists of kB length L packets.
Similarly, using the first k2 packets that that Calvin acknowledges, Alice and Calvin create kC secret key
packets. The MDS codes are publicly known and fixed in advance.
Message encryption and transmission
Encryption
4. Alice and Bob produce N1 linear combinations of their kB secret keys as K ′B = KBGK ′B , where GK ′B
is a (kB × N1) matrix and is a generator matrix of an (N1, kB) MDS code which is also publicly known.
Similarly, Alice and Calvin create N2 linear combinations of their kC keys.
5. Alice creates N1 encrypted messages to send to Bob
UB,i =W1,i ⊕K
′
B,i, i = 1 . . . N1
where ⊕ is addition in the FLq vector space. Let UB denote the set of UB,i, i = 1, . . . , N1. She similarly
produces a set UC of N2 encrypted messages to send to Calvin
UC,i =W2,i ⊕K
′
C,i, i = 1 . . . N2
Transmissions to Bob
6. Alice sequentially takes each of the UB,i, i = 1 . . . N1, encrypted packets and repeatedly transmits it, until
it is acknowledged either by Bob or Calvin. That is, if at time iAlice transmits Xi = UB,j for some j < N1,
then
Xi+1 =
{
Xi, if S∗i = ∅
UB,j+1, otherwise.
(15)
7. (a) At the end of n2 transmissions of UB packets, if Bob did not acknowledge N1(1 − δ1)/(1 − δ1δ2) of
them, a protocol error is declared for Bob and we move to step 8 below. If Calvin did not acknowledge
N1(1− δ2)/(1 − δ1δ2) packets, an error is declared for Calvin and continue transmitting UB packets.
(b) If all the UB packets are not exhausted before n2 + n4 transmissions, we declare a protocol error for
Bob and proceed to the next step.
Transmissions to Calvin
8. Similarly, Alice takes each of the UC,i, i = 1 . . . N2 packets and repeatedly transmits it, until it is acknowl-
edged either by Bob or Calvin.That is, if at time i we had Xi = UC,j for some j < N2, then
Xi+1 =
{
Xi, if S∗i = ∅
UC,j+1, otherwise.
(16)
9. (a) At the end of n3 transmissions of UC packets, if Calvin did not acknowledge N2(1 − δ2)/(1 − δ1δ2)
of them, a protocol error is declared for Calvin and we move to step 10 below. If Bob did not acknowledge
N2(1− δ1)/(1 − δ1δ2) packets, we declare an error for Bob and continue transmitting UC packets.
(b) If all the UC packets are not exhausted before n3 + n4 transmissions, we declare a protocol error for
Calvin and proceed to the next step.
Transmissions to both
10. At this step, Alice knows the following:
– At the end of step 6, there may exist some encrypted packets that are acknowledged only by Calvin and
not by Bob. Assume we have N ′1 such packets, and denote them as U ′B,i, i = 1 . . . N ′1.
– Similarly, at the end of step 8, there may exist some N ′2 encrypted packets U ′C,i, i = 1 . . . N ′2, that only
Bob has acknowledged and not Calvin.
Alice proceeds to transmit ⊕ combinations of U ′B,i and U ′C,i packets.
– She starts by transmitting U ′B,1 ⊕ U ′C,1.
– If at time i Alice transmits Xi = U ′B,j ⊕ U ′C,ℓ for some j < N ′1 and ℓ < N ′2, then
Xi+1 =


Xi if S∗i = ∅,
U ′B,j+1 ⊕ U
′
C,ℓ if S∗i = B,
Xi+1 = U
′
B,j ⊕ U
′
C,ℓ+1 if S∗i = C,
Xi+1 = U
′
B,j+1 ⊕ U
′
C,ℓ+1 if S∗i = BC.
– If Alice first finishes all the N ′1 packets U ′B,i, she continues by transmitting the remaining N ′2 packets
until Calvin receives all of them.
– Similarly if she first finishes all the U ′C,i packets, she continues with the remaining N ′1 packets until
Bob acknowledges them.
11. If steps 6 and 10 together exceed n2 + n4 transmissions an error is declared for Bob. Similarly, if steps 8
and 10 take together exceed n3 +n4 transmissions an error is declared for Calvin. In any case, the protocol
is terminated when the channel has been used for n times.
5 Analysis
Theorem 2. For any ǫ, ǫ′ > 0 there exists a large enough n for which the scheme described above is secure
against a malicious user and achieves (in the sense of (6)) any rate pair in the region defined by (7)-(8).
Proof. Below, we prove that the above scheme is secure against a malicious user and runs without error with
high probability. The rate assertion of the theorem follows from a simple numerical evaluation with the given
parameter values.
5.1 Security
In our argument we focus on the secrecy of W1 against a malicious Calvin, but the same reasoning works for
W2 against a malicious Bob as well. Since we do not intend to give security guarantees to a malicious user and
consider at most one user to be malicious, we may assume that Bob is honest. Moreover, under our definition
of malicious user, W1 and W2 are independent and the latter is uniformly distributed over its alphabet, but the
distribution of W1 is arbitrary and controlled by the malicious Calvin.
To analyze the secrecy of W1, we may, without loss of generality, assume that no error was declared for
Bob during the key generation phase. Recall that an error is declared for Bob only if Bob fails to acknowledge
at least k1 packets. If an error was in fact declared for Bob, no information about Bob’s message W1 is ever
transmitted by Alice7. However, note that we do account for this error event when we analyze the probability
of error for Bob in the Section 5.2.
We first show that I(KB ;Y n12 Sn1) can be made small, i.e., the key generation phase is secure.
7 More precisely, if EI-B is the indicator random variable for an error being declared for Bob in the key generation phase,
I(W1;Y
n
2 , S
n
, ΘC) ≤ I(W1;Y
n
2 , S
n
, ΘC , EI-B) = I(W1;Y
n
2 , S
n
, ΘC |EI-B) ≤ I(W1;Y
n
2 , S
n
, ΘC |EI-B = 0).
To avoid clutter, we leave out the conditioning event in the rest of this subsection.
Lemma 1. When Bob is honest and no error is declared for Bob in the key generation phase,
I(KB ;Y
n1
2 S
n1) ≤ kBe
−c1
√
k1L log q, (17)
if k1 = kBδ2 + 1δ2
(
2kB
δ2
)3/4
and kB ≥ 2δ2 , where c1 > 0 is some constant. Moreover, KB is uniformly distributed
over its alphabet.
The key facts we use in proving this lemma are (i) the number of packets seen by Calvin concentrates around
its mean and (ii) an MDS parity check matrix can be used to perform privacy amplification in the packet erasure
setting.
We still need to show that the secrecy condition (4) is satisfied by the scheme even if Calvin controls the
distribution of W1. We have
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘC) ≤ I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘCUC) = I(W1;Y
n
2 |Y
n1
2 S
nΘCUC), (18)
where the last equality used the fact that ΘA, ΘC ,W2, Sn are independent of W1 and we may express Y n12 , UC
as deterministic functions of ΘA, ΘC ,W2, Sn. Let 1CB,i be the indicator random variable for the event that
Calvin observes the packet UB,i either in its pure form or in a form where the UB,i packet is added with some
UC,j packet. Let MCB be the random variable which denotes the number of distinct packets of UB that Calvin
observes, so MCB =
∑N1
i=1 1
C
B,i. We have the following two lemmas:
Lemma 2. H(Y n2 |Y
n1
2 S
nΘCUC) ≤ E
{
MCB
}
L log q.
Lemma 3. H(Y n2 |W1Y
n1
2 S
nΘCUC) ≥ E
{
min
(
kB ,M
C
B
)}
− I(KB ;Y
n1
2 S
n1).
Using these in (18), we have
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘC) ≤ E
{
max
(
0,MCB − kB
)}
L log q + I(KB ;Y
n1
2 S
n1). (19)
Lemma 1 gives a bound for the second term. We can bound the first term using concentration inequalities. In
order to do this, let ZB,i be the number of repetitions of a packet UB,i that Alice makes until Bob acknowledges
it (where we count both the transmission in pure form and in addition with some packet from UC). Note that the
random variables ZB,i are independent of each other and have the same distribution. This follows from the fact
that the Si sequence is i.i.d., and each Si is independent of (Y i−12 , Si−1, ΘC). In other words, Calvin can exert
no control over the channel state. Further, for the same reason, with every repetition the chance that Calvin
obtains the transmission is 1− δ2. This implies that the indicator random variables 1CB,i are i.i.d. with
Pr
{
1CB,i = 1
}
= (1− δ2) + δ1δ2(1− δ2) + . . . =
1− δ2
1− δ1δ2
.
Notice that MCB is a sum of N1 such independent random variables, and hence E
{
MCB
}
= N1
1−δ2
1−δ1δ2 . Since
kB = N1
1−δ2
1−δ1δ2 +
(
N1
1−δ2
1−δ1δ2
)3/4
, by applying Chernoff-Hoeffding bound we have
E
{
max
(
0,MCB − kB
)}
≤ N1 Pr
{
MCB > kB
}
≤ N1e
−c2
√
N1 , (20)
for a constant c2 > 0. Substituting this together with Lemma 1 in (19) we get
I(W1;Y
n
2 S
nΘC) ≤ N1e
−c2
√
N1 + kBe
−c2
√
kB ,
for constants c1, c2 > 0. By choosing8 a large enough value of N1, we may meet (4).
8 Recall from (9)-(14) that by saying that we choose N1 large enough we cause n to be large enough.
5.2 Error probability
We need to bound the probability that an error is declared for Bob9. An error happens if:
− Bob receives less than k1 packets in the first phase,
− he does not receive N1(1 − δ1)/(1 − δ1δ2) packets of UB in step 7(a), or N(1 − δ2)/(1 − δ1δ2) packets of
UC in step 9(a),
− he does not receive all the N1 packets of UB (either in pure form or added with a packet in UC) before step
11 intervenes.
All these error events have the same nature. An error happens if Bob collects significantly fewer packets
than he is expected to receive in a particular step. The probability of these events can be bounded by applying
the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound as we did to show the security guarantee (20). The sum of these bounds gives
an upper bound on the overall error probability of the scheme, which in turn can be made smaller than ǫ by
choosing N1 large enough. A straightforward computation using the parameters in (9)-(14) shows that (6) is
also satisfied. ⊓⊔
6 Impossibility result (converse)
With Theorem 3 we complete the proof of Theorem 1. Throughout this section we will assume that both Bob
and Calvin are honest. Obviously, an upper bound for this case is a valid upper bound in the case of a malicious
user as well. Interestingly, we get the same bounds for the honest-but-curious users’ and for the malicious users’
case. Our proof relies on a few Lemmas which can be found together with their proofs in Appendix C.
Theorem 3. For the secret message capacity region as defined in Definition 4 it holds that:
R1(1− δ2)
δ2(1− δ1)(1− δ1δ2)
+
R1
1− δ1
+
R2
1− δ1δ2
≤ L log q,
R2(1− δ1)
δ1(1− δ2)(1− δ1δ2)
+
R1
1− δ1δ2
+
R2
1− δ2
≤ L log q.
Proof. We will prove the first inequality, the second follows from symmetry. We look at Alice’s transmissions
from Bob’s perspective and express them in three terms (21a)-(21c) using elementary properties of entropy:
nL log q ≥ nH(Xi) ≥
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y
i−1
1 S
i−1) =
n∑
i=1
[
H(Xi|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1) + I(Xi;Y i−12 |Y
i−1
1 S
i−1)
]
=
n∑
i=1

H(Xi|Y i−11 Y i−12 Si−1W1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
+ I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
+ I(Xi;Y
i−1
2 |Y
i−1
1 S
i−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(c)

 . (21)
Lemmas 4-7 give lower bounds on each of the three terms in (21); putting these together results in the stated
inequality. ⊓⊔
Intuition: We now informally interpret the terms in (21) with our protocol (of Section 4) in mind. Note however
that the proof provides a general impossibility bound that holds for any scheme that satisfies Definition 4. The
terms (21a)-(21c) classify the information Alice sends during the ith transmission. These terms can also be
interpreted as balancing key generation and consumption for secrecy, as described below.
Term (21a) can be interpreted as anything that is not related to Bob’s message W1 (and has not been
seen by either Bob or Calvin). This is lower bounded through Lemmas 6-7. For example, in our protocol this
corresponds to a key generation attempt for either Bob or Calvin, or a new encrypted message for Calvin, i.e.,
steps 1 and 8.
9 Note that, under our protocol, if no error is declared for Bob, he will be able to decode W1.
Term (21b) is interpreted as an encrypted packet that Alice tries to send to Bob, which has not already been
received by Calvin. This is lower bounded in Lemma 4. In our protocol this occurs in transmissions directed
towards Bob only in step 6.
Term (21c) brings information that Calvin has already seen during previous transmissions, but Bob has not
seen. This is lower bounded in Lemma 5. In our protocol this would correspond to transmissions in step 10.
7 Extensions and discussion
We showed that it is possible to provide unconditional security guarantees while wirelessly broadcasting two
private messages; we characterized all possible transmission rate pairs for the private messages, and showed we
can achieve these using a simple protocol that efficiently generates and utilizes an appropriate amount of key.
We conclude our paper with several natural extensions and some open questions.
Practical deployment: Our protocol has low complexity (see Appendix A) and does not require changing the
physical layer transceivers of the three users; it is thus attractive for a potential system deployment. Although
we only claim optimality under the modeling assumptions of Section 2, we believe such a system could enable
operation at high secret message rates (for the parameters in Fig. 2, of the order of 100Kbits/sec per user), using
channel conditioning techniques of [9,10].
Common message: Assume that besides the private messages, we also have a common message Wc (and
corresponding rate Rc) that we want to deliver to both Bob and Calvin. Our protocol and the converse proof
can be easily extended to cover this case. The capacity region becomes
max
{
R1(1− δ2)
δ2(1− δ1)(1− δ1δ2)
,
R2(1− δ1)
δ1(1− δ2)(1− δ1δ2)
}
+max
{
R1 +Rc
1− δ1
+
R2
1− δ1δ2
,
R1
1− δ1δ2
+
R2 +Rc
1− δ2
}
≤ L log q, (22)
where the second term is the known bound for (not-secure) message sending [2], while the first term corresponds
to the overhead of key generation, same as before.
Partially secret messages: Another natural extension is to keep secret only one part of the private message to
each user; that is, we have W1 = (W ′1,W ′′1 ), W2 = (W ′2,W ′′2 ) with a secrecy requirement only for W ′1 and
W ′2. Accordingly, R1 = R′1 + R′′1 , R2 = R′2 + R′′2 . Assuming the messages are independent and W ′′1 ,W ′′2 are
uniformly distributed over their alphabets, our results easily extends to this case, with capacity region
max
{
R′1(1− δ2)
δ2(1− δ1)(1− δ1δ2)
−
R′′1
1− δ1δ2
,
R′2(1− δ1)
δ1(1− δ2)(1 − δ1δ2)
−
R′′2
1− δ1δ2
, 0
}
+max
{
R1 +Rc
1− δ1
+
R2
1− δ1δ2
,
R1
1− δ1δ2
+
R2 +Rc
1− δ2
}
≤ L log q. (23)
Correlated erasures: Our results extend to arbitrary correlation between the erasure patterns, as long as the
distribution is known a-priori. Both the protocol and the converse can be modified to characterize the secure
transmission rates for this case. The resulting capacity region depends on the joint distribution.
Strengthening the malicious user: Our security guarantees assume that the malicious user may choose the
marginal distribution of the other user’s message, but his own message is assumed to be independent and
uniformly distributed over its alphabet; moreover, he can only learn his message through the channel outputs
he receives. A stronger malicious user could choose the joint distribution of the messages (and may also have
access to his own message). Even under this stronger security definition, it is not hard to see we can achieve
nonzero rates (e.g., by two instantiations of our protocol, first for Bob with R2 set to 0 and then for Calvin with
R1 set to 0), however we conjecture that the capacity region is in general smaller than what we derived here.
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks: We leave the question open if the malicious user launches denial-of-service
attacks (outside of what our current model allows); however, in general such attacks can be deterred by ensuring
they reveal who the attacker is. As an example, in the key generation phase of our protocol, we assumed that
Bob & Calvin cannot learn the other’s feedback before sending their own. This assumption stops a malicious
Bob from acknowledging the exact same packets as Calvin which would lead to protocol failure for Calvin and
a DoS attack. In practice, for half the ACKs, we can ask Bob to send them first before Calvin, and for the other
half Calvin to send them first before Bob, and thus identify users attempting such attacks. In this category are
also attacks that attempt to (partially) control the channel, for example through physical layer jamming, where
we can resort to physical layer techniques to find the jammer’s real location.
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A Complexity considerations
It is clear from the analysis in Section 5 that the length n of the scheme grows as max{O(log2(1ǫ ), O(
1
ǫ′4
)},
where ǫ is the security and probability of error parameter, and ǫ′ is the gap parameter associated with the rate
(see Definition 4). The algorithmic complexity is quadratic in n; quadratic from the matrix multiplication to
produce the key.
Also, for the proposed scheme, the size (entropy in bits) of ΘA is linear in n and no private randomness is
needed at Bob and Calvin. For a malicious user, we allow unlimited amount of private randomness.
Table 2. Summary of notation
Xi, Y1,i, Y2,i The ith input and outputs of the channel
Si, S
∗
i The actual and the acknowledged ith state of the channel
δ1, δ2 Erasure probabilities of Bob’s and Calvin’s channel
W1,W2 Private messages for Bob and Calvin
KB ,KC Shared keys between Alice-Bob, Alice-Calvin
K′B ,K
′
C Keys used for encryption, dependent linear combinations of packets in KB (or KC )
UB , UC Encrypted messages of Bob and Calvin
L Size of a packet in terms of Fq symbols
N1, N2 Size of W1 and W2 (in packets)
R1, R2 Secret message rates for Bob and Calvin
ΘA, ΘB , ΘC Private randomness of Alice, Bob and Calvin
kB , kC Size of the keys KB and KC (in packets)
Vi ith element of any vector V
V i First i elements of any vector V , i.e., (V1, V2, . . . Vi)
B Proof of lemmas in Section 5
Lemma 1. When Bob is honest and no error is declared for Bob in the key generation phase,
I(KB ;Y
n1
2 S
n1) ≤ kBe
−c1
√
k1L log q, (24)
if k1 = kBδ2 + 1δ2
(
2kB
δ2
)3/4
and kB ≥ 2δ2 , where c1 is some constant. Moreover, KB is uniformly distributed
over its alphabet.
Proof. With a slight abuse of notation, in the following XBC1 will denote the actual packets Calvin received
(not necessarily the same as those that he acknowledges) out of the first k1 packets Bob received. Note that
here we assume that an error was not declared for Bob in the key generation phase and hence Bob did receive
at least k1 packets in the key generation phase. Also let XB∅1 be the packets seen only by Bob among the first
k1 he receives. Let IB∅ and IBC be the index sets corresponding to XB∅1 and XBC1 . Recall that XB1 denotes the
first k1 packets received by Bob. The notation M I will denote a matrix M restricted to the columns defined by
index set I . Given this,
I(KB ;Y
n1
2 S
n1) = I(XB1 GKB ;X
BC
1 S
n)
= H(XB1 GKB )−H(X
B
1 GKB |X
BC
1 S
n)
= kBL log q −H(X
B
1 GKB |X
BC
1 S
n)
= kBL log q −H(
[
XB∅1 G
IB∅
KB
XBC1 G
IBC
KB
]
|XBC1 S
n)
= kBL log q −H(X
B∅
1 G
IB∅
KB
|XBC1 S
n)
= kBL log q −H(X
B∅
1 G
IB∅
KB
|Sn),
where the third equality follows from the MDS property of the matrix GKB . Using the same property, we have
H(XB∅1 G
IB∅
KB
|Sn) =
k1∑
i=0
min{i, kB}L log qPr
{
|XB∅1 | = i
}
≥ kBL log q
k1∑
i=kB
Pr
{
|XB∅1 | = i
}
= kBL log qPr
{
|XB∅1 | ≥ kB
}
= kBL log q
(
1− Pr
{
|XB∅1 | < kB
})
= kBL log q
(
1− Pr
{
|XBC1 | ≥ k1 − kB
})
(a)
≥ kBL log q
(
1− Pr
{
|XBC1 | ≥ (1− δ2)k1 + k1
3/4
})
≥ kBL log q
(
1− Pr
{∣∣|XBC1 | − E [|XBC1 |]∣∣ > k13/4}) ,
where the inequality (a) follows from the fact that the conditions on kB and k1 imply that
k1 − kB ≥ (1− δ2)k1 + k1
3/4.
The Chernoff-Hoeffding bound gives that for some constant c1 > 0
Pr
{∣∣|XBC1 | − E [|XBC1 |]∣∣ > k13/4} ≤ e−c1√k1 .
So, we have that
I(KB ;Y
n1Sn) ≤ kBL log qe
−c1
√
k1 . (25)
The final assertion of the lemma is a simple consequence of the MDS property of the code and the fact that
Xn1 are i.i.d. uniform. ⊓⊔
Lemma 2.
H(Y n2 |Y
n1
2 S
nΘCUC) ≤ E {MB}L log q.
Proof. Let UCB be a vector of length N1 such that the i-th element UCB,i is UB,i if Calvin observes this UB,i
either in the pure form or added with some element of UC , and UCB,i =⊥ otherwise. Let 1CB,i is the indicator
random variable for the event UCB,i 6=⊥. It is easy to see that the following are information equivalent (i.e., we
can express each side as a deterministic function of the other)
(Y n2 , S
n, ΘC , UC) ≡ (U
C
B , Y
n1
2 , S
n, ΘC , UC).
Therefore,
H(Y n2 S
nΘCUC) = H(U
C
B Y
n1
2 S
nΘCUC).
H(Y n2 |Y
n1
2 S
nΘCUC) = H(U
C
B |Y
n1
2 S
nΘCUC)
=
N1∑
i=1
H(UCB,i|U
C i−1
B Y
n1
2 S
nΘCUC)
=
N1∑
i=1
H(UCB,i|1
C
B,iU
C i−1
B Y
n1
2 S
nΘCUC)
≤
N1∑
i=1
H(UCB,i|1
C
B,i)
≤
N1∑
i=1
(L log q) Pr
{
1CB,i = 1
}
= E
{
N1∑
i=1
1CB,i
}
(L log q).
where the third equality follows from the fact that the indicator random variable 1CB,i is a deterministic function
of the conditioning random variables.
⊓⊔
Lemma 3.
H(Y n2 |W1Y
n1
2 S
nΘCUC) ≥ E
{
min
(
kB ,M
C
B
)}
L log q − I(KB ;Y
n1
2 S
n1).
Proof. We adopt the notation for UCB and 1CB,i introduced in the proof of Lemma 2. In addition, let K ′CB be
defined in a similar manner as UCB such that K ′
C
B,i =⊥ if UCB,i =⊥ and K ′
C
B,i = K
′
B,i otherwise. Also, let 1CB
be the vector of indicator random variables 1CB,i, j = 1, . . . , N1.
Proceeding as in the proof of Lemma 2, we have
H(Y n2 |W1Y
n1
2 S
nΘCUC) = H(U
C
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2 S
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2 S
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But, from the MDS property of GK ′
B
, and the fact that KB is uniformly distributed over its alphabet, we have
H(K ′CB |1
C
B) =
N1∑
i=1
min(i, kB) Pr

∑
j=1
1CB,j = i

L log q
= E
{
min
(
kB ,
N1∑
i=1
1CB,i
)}
L log q.
Also,
I(K ′CB ;W1Y
n1
2 S
nΘCUC |1
C
B)
(a)
= I(K ′CB ;Y
n1
2 S
n1 |1CB)
≤ I(K ′CB1
C
B ;Y
n1
2 S
n1)
≤ I(KB ;Y
n1
2 S
n1).
where (a) follows from the fact that the distribution of W2 (uniform and independent of Sn, ΘA, ΘC ) implies
that UC is independent of ΘA, Sn and using this we can argue that the following is Markov chain
K ′CB − (1
C
B , Y
n1
2 , S
n1)− (W1, ΘC , UC).
Substituting back we have the lemma. ⊓⊔
C Proof of Lemmas 4-7
First we give a bound on (21b). The first lemma expresses that Alice has to send sufficient information of
message W1 such that the Bob and Calvin together (in fact Bob himself also) can reconstruct it despite of
erasures.
Lemma 4. From conditions (1)-(3) it follows that
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1) ≥
nR1
1− δ1δ2
− E1
where E1 = h2(ǫ
′)+ǫ′L log q
1−δ1δ2 .
Proof.
nR1 − E1(1− δ1δ2) ≤ I(Y
n
1 Y
n
2 S
n;W1) =
n∑
i=1
I(Y1iY2iSi;W1|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y1iY2i;W1|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1Si) =
n∑
i=1
I(Y1iY2i;W1|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1, Si 6= ∅) Pr{Si 6= ∅}
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1)(1 − δ1δ2)
Here, the first inequality is Fano’s inequality [29] (Chapter 2). Besides, we exploited the independence property
of Si. ⊓⊔
Lemma 5. From conditions (1)-(3) it follows that
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
2 |Y
i−1
1 S
i−1) ≥
nR1δ1(1− δ2)
(1− δ1)(1 − δ1δ2)
− E2,
where E2 = h2(ǫ
′)+ǫ′L log q
1−δ1 .
Proof. From Lemma 9
nR1
1− δ1
− E2 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
1 S
i−1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1) + I(Xi;Y i−12 |Y
i−1
1 S
i−1)− I(Xi;Y i−12 |Y
i−1
1 S
i−1W1)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1) + I(Xi;Y i−12 |Y
i−1
1 S
i−1)
≤
nR1
1− δ1δ2
+
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
2 |Y
i−1
1 S
i−1) (26)
To get (26) we used Lemma 8. ⊓⊔
Lemma 6 can be interpreted as the connection between the generation and consumption of the randomness
Bob knows but Calvin doesn’t.
Lemma 6. From conditions (1)-(3) it follows that
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1W1) ≥
(1− δ2)
(1− δ1)δ2
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
1 |Y
i−1
2 S
i−1W1)
Proof.
0 ≤ H(Y n1 S
n|Y n2 S
nW1) = H(Y
n−1
1 S
n−1|Y n2 S
nW1) +H(Y1nSn|Y
n−1
1 Y
n
2 S
nW1)
= H(Y n−11 S
n−1|Y n−12 S
n−1W1)− I(Y n−11 S
n−1;Y2nSn|Y n−12 S
n−1W1) +H(Y1n|Y n−11 Y
n
2 S
nW1)
= H(Y n−11 S
n−1|Y n−12 S
n−1W1)− I(Y n−11 S
n−1;Y2n|Y n−12 S
n−1SnW1) +H(Y1n|Y n−11 Y
n
2 S
nW1)
= H(Y n−11 S
n−1|Y n−12 S
n−1W1)− I(Y n−11 S
n−1;Y2n|Y n−12 S
n−1W1, C ⊂ Sn) Pr{C ⊂ Sn}
+H(Y1n|Y
n−1
1 Y
n
2 S
n−1W1, Sn = B) Pr{Sn = B}
+H(Y1n|Y
n−1
1 Y
n
2 S
n−1W1, Sn = BC) Pr{Sn = BC}
= H(Y n−11 S
n−1|Y n−12 S
n−1W1)− I(Y n−11 S
n−1;Xn|Y n−12 S
n−1W1)(1− δ2)
+H(Xn|Y
n−1
1 Y
n−1
2 S
n−1W1)(1 − δ1)δ2 +H(Xn|Y n−11 Y
n−1
2 XnS
n−1W1)(1− δ1)(1− δ2)
= H(Y n−11 S
n−1|Y n−12 S
n−1W1)− I(Y n−11 S
n−1;Xn|Y n−12 S
n−1W1)(1− δ2)
+H(Xn|Y
n−1
1 Y
n−1
2 S
n−1W1)(1 − δ1)δ2
We do the same steps recursively to obtain the statement of the lemma. ⊓⊔
Lemma 7. From the conditions (1)-(3) it also follows that
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
1 |Y
i−1
2 S
i−1W1) + E5 >
nR1
1− δ1δ2
+
nR2δ2(1− δ1)
(1− δ2)(1− δ1δ2)
Proof. From Lemma 10,
E3 >
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
2 S
i−1)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y
i−1
2 S
i−1)−H(Xi|Y i−12 S
i−1W1)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1) + I(X1;Y i−11 |Y
i−1
2 S
i−1)−H(Xi|Y i−12 S
i−1W1)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Xi|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1W1)−H(Xi|Y i−12 S
i−1W1)
+ I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1) + I(X1;Y i−11 |Y
i−1
2 S
i−1)
=
n∑
i=1
−I(Xi;Y
i−1
1 |Y
i−1
2 S
i−1W1) + I(Xi;W1|Y i−11 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1) + I(X1;Y i−11 |Y
i−1
2 S
i−1)
From Lemma 1,
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1) ≥
nR1
1− δ1δ2
− E1.
Further, a symmetric result to Lemma 5 shows:
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y
i−1
1 |Y
i−1
2 S
i−1) ≥
nR2δ2(1− δ1)
(1− δ2)(1 − δ1δ2)
− E4,
where E4 = h2(ǫ
′)+ǫ′L log q
1−δ2 . Applying these bounds results the statement of the lemma, with E5 = E3+ E1+ E4.
⊓⊔
Lemma 8. From conditions (1)-(3) it follows that
nR1
1− δ1δ2
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1)
Proof.
nR1 ≥ H(W1) ≥ I(Y
n
1 Y
n
2 S
n;W1) =
n∑
i=1
I(Y1iY2iSi;W1|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y1iY2i;W1|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1Si) =
n∑
i=1
I(Y1iY2i;W1|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1, Si 6= ∅) Pr{Si 6= ∅}
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
1 Y
i−1
2 S
i−1)(1 − δ1δ2)
We used the same properties as before. ⊓⊔
With the same type of argument that we used to prove Lemma 4, we can show also the following:
Lemma 9. From conditions (1)-(3) it follows that
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
1 S
i−1) ≥
nR1
1− δ1
− E2.
Lemma 10. From the security condition (4) it follows that
E3 >
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
2 S
i−1),
where E3 = ǫ1−δ2 .
Proof. From (4), we have that
ǫ > I(Y n2 S
nΘC ;W1) ≥ I(Y
n
2 S
n;W1) =
n∑
i=1
I(W1;Y2iSi|Y
i−1
2 S
i−1) =
n∑
i=1
I(Y2i;W1|Y
i−1
2 S
i−1Si)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y2i;W1|Y
i−1
2 S
i−1, C ⊂ Si) Pr{C ⊂ Si}
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
2 S
i−1, C ⊂ Si)(1− δ2) =
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;W1|Y
i−1
2 S
i−1)(1 − δ2)
⊓⊔
